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I. Introduction
Smoking is the most common preventable cause of death in the United 
States, accounting for over 480,000 deaths each year.
1
  For most smokers, 
the addiction begins at a young age—nine out of ten smokers first tried a 
cigarette before age eighteen.
2
  Unsurprisingly, cigarette advertising and 
*
J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, B.A. History, B.A.
Political Science, 2012, University of California, Irvine.
1. Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/health_effects/effects_cig_smoking/ (last 
updated Oct. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking]. 
2. Youth and Tobacco Use, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.c
dc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/youth_data/tobacco_use/index.htm (last updated Oct.
14, 2015).
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promotion has a causal link to smoking among adolescents.
3
  But this 
relationship persists notwithstanding the fact that advertising and 
promotion is either illegal or severely restricted in the media on numerous 
platforms including television, radio, and billboards.
4
  According to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the leading cause of 
adolescent smoking may be one of the last forms of unrestricted 
“advertising”:  movies.
5
  Movies can affect youths as significantly as 
advertisements, if not more.
6
  Eliminating the appearance of cigarettes and 
tobacco in movies directed at adolescents would play a significant part in 
preventing tobacco use among youth.
7
 
Reducing adolescent smoking will help reduce the immense societal 
costs of smoking.  Smoking causes many serious health conditions 
including lung cancer, heart attacks, and chronic lung disease.
8
  A recent 
study found that smoking may also cause infections, kidney disease, and 
intestinal disease.
9
  The CDC estimates that at the current rate, 5.6 million 
of today’s youth will die prematurely from smoke-related illnesses and 
diseases.
10
  These smoke-related illnesses cost individuals and states over 
$175.9 billion each year in healthcare-related expenditures.
11
  Suing 
tobacco companies is one way to reduce these effects, but those who smoke 
are typically left without adequate legal remedies for the harms stemming 
from cigarette use.  The Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1966
12
 
(“CLAA” or “the Act”) preempts most state law claims against tobacco 
companies.
13
  For the few claims that are not preempted by the Act, 
3. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH 
AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 522 (2012), http:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK99237/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK99237.pdf [hereinafter 2012 
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]. 
4. Id. at 600; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 797 (2014), 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf [hereinafter 
2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT]. 
5. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 797–98.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 798.
8. See Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, supra note 1; Denise Grady, Smoking’s Toll on
Health Is Even Worse Than Previously Thought, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/health/smokings-health-toll-worse-than-previously-thought-
study-says.html?ref=health&_r=1. 
9. Grady, supra note 8.
10. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 675.
11. Id. at 867.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
13. Id. § 1334; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Tuosto v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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tobacco companies often escape liability.
14
  Class action lawsuits against 
tobacco companies are generally unsuccessful,
15
 and tobacco companies 
take advantage of individual suits by exhausting plaintiffs’ resources.
16
  
Even if individuals are successful initially, appellate courts often reduce 
large damage awards on appeal.
17
 
The legal system must do more to ameliorate the health and economic 
costs of cigarettes by curbing initiation of youth smoking.  Despite 
advertising restrictions, smoking in the media is still widespread, especially 
prominent in films.  Hollywood has done little in order to reduce the 
appearance and appeal of cigarettes among youth, despite numerous studies 
uncovering a strong correlation between youth smoking and cigarette use 
movies.  One solution is to put moral pressure on filmmakers to reduce the 
allure of smoking in movies targeted at adolescents.  Legal action against 
movie production companies for damages caused by cigarette-related 
injuries and illnesses is one way to put pressure on filmmakers.  However, 
in similar suits against video game and production companies, plaintiffs 
encountered serious legal barriers.  Production companies that create 
violent media have escaped liability because courts previously ruled that 
the companies owe no duty to victims of violent crimes allegedly motivated 
or fantasized by their violent games and movies.
18
  Similarly, to date, no 
court has found movie producers liable for damages suffered by young 
adults who began smoking in part due to depictions in films.  Courts are 
hesitant because such a finding would effectively punish movie production 
companies for exercising their right to freedom of expression under the 
First Amendment. 
An alternative to fighting the uphill legal battle against filmmakers is to 
bring legal action against the Motion Picture Association of America 
(“MPAA”) to incentivize it to give R ratings to films with depictions of 
smoking.  The harsher rating would deter filmmakers from placing 
cigarettes in films and thus decrease cigarette exposure to adolescents.  
Litigation against the MPAA could prove to be successful because the 
aforementioned legal barriers may no longer apply.  The MPAA may owe a 
duty to moviegoers, or at least parents of young moviegoers, to adequately 
advise parents about cigarette use in films.  Even if a lawsuit proves to be 
14. Sara D. Guardino & Richard A. Daynard, Punishing Tobacco Company Misconduct:
The Case for Exceeding a Single Digit Ratio Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages, 67 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 37 (2005).
15. See 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, app. 14.2 at 4.
16. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 14, at 36.
17. See 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, app. 14.3 at 5, tbl.14.3.1.
18. See, e.g., Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002).
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unsuccessful, the bad publicity and costs that accompany litigation may be 
sufficient to pressure the MPAA to act appropriately. 
If litigation is unsuccessful, government regulation of the MPAA rating 
system may be an effective way to end youth exposure to cigarettes 
because the depiction of cigarettes in the media is already regulated.  The 
CLAA significantly restricts cigarette advertisements or promotions.
19
  
Additionally, an agreement between forty-six states and Big Tobacco
20
 
further limits the prevalence of cigarette advertisements.
21
  Although these 
restrictions are already in place, smoking among youth is still prevalent.  A 
regulation requiring the MPAA to give all movies with significant 
depictions of cigarettes an R rating may reduce youth smoking 
significantly. 
Part I discusses the litigation and legislative history surrounding 
tobacco regulation.  Part II provides background in addition to past and 
present criticisms of the MPAA.  Part III analyzes the potential liability of 
production companies to individuals with smoke-related health issues that 
could, in part, be caused by cigarette depictions in movies while discussing 
possible constitutional issues.  Part IV argues that the best solution is to 
pursue legal action against the MPAA to pressure it to give R ratings to 
movies that depict cigarettes, and include “smoking” in its rating criteria.  
Part IV also considers other options, such as further government regulation 
in the form of government-sponsored ratings for movies that depict 
smoking.  Finally, this note concludes by considering these alternative 
solutions and determining their likelihood of success. 
II. Tobacco Legislation and Litigation
A. The Ban on Cigarette Advertising
Congress passed the CLAA in 1971 to address the problems with
respect to smoking and health and to adequately inform the public about 
cigarettes.
22
  The Act prohibits the advertisement of cigarettes on any 
medium of communication governed by the Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) and requires specific warning labels on cigarette 
packages.
23
  Broadcasting companies challenged the CLAA as a violation 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012).
20. For purposes of this note, “Big Tobacco” refers to large tobacco companies in the
United States. 
21. Master Settlement Agreement, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. § III(e), http://www.
naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf [hereinafter MSA]. 
22. See § 1331.
23. Id. §§ 1333, 1335 ([I]t shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes . . . on any medium of
electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications 
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of the First Amendment, and the court upheld the law.
24
  The court 
reasoned that product advertising is commercial speech and, therefore, is 
entitled to less constitutional protection.
25
  The court also noted that the 
broadcasting companies did not lose their right to speak, but only the right 
to collect revenue from third-party advertisers.
26
  Further, the Act is within 
Congress’ supervisory role to regulate the FCC.
27
  The court also rejected 
the companies’ Fifth Amendment argument and held that there is a rational 
basis for banning cigarette advertisements because substantial evidence 




The CLAA expressly preempts any state law action regarding 
advertising or promotion of cigarettes.
29
  Common law claims regarding 
failure to warn or fraudulent statements are thus preempted, and therefore 
easily dismissed.
30
  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 




Advertising is only one of many factors that induce smoking among 
teens and young adults.
32
  Some social science studies show that peer 
pressure, parental smoking habits, and socioeconomic status are also 
significant causes of smoking in youths.
33
  Given the variety of factors and 
the disparity between social science studies, Professor Clay Calvert notes 
that the evidence fails to demonstrate any causal relationship between 
cigarette advertising and smoking among youth.
34
  He further warns that 
using speculative and inconsistent social science evidence to censor 
commercial speech raises important First Amendment issues.
35
  According 
Commission.”).  The FCC governs all communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and 
cable.  FCC, What We Do, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
24. See Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972). 
25. Id. at 584.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 585–86.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012).
30. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992); Tuosto v. Philip Morris
USA Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
31. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527–30.
32. Clay Calvert, Excising Media Images to Solve Societal Ills: Communication, Media
Effects, Social Science, and the Regulation of Tobacco Advertising, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 401, 449–
51 (1998) (listing fourteen factors associated with adolescent smoking). 
33. Id. at 453–55.
34. Id. at 458.
35. Id. at 468 (“To censor media messages on speculative beliefs and ‘common sense’ about
the harms they cause is simply foolhardy.”). 
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to the Supreme Court, however, Congress presented sufficient evidence to 




B. State and Federal Tobacco Litigation and the Master Settlement
Agreement
In 1994, state attorneys general from four states brought lawsuits
against Big Tobacco demanding compensation for healthcare expenditures 
resulting from smoke-related illnesses and diseases.
37
  By 1998, the 
companies settled with all states, creating the Master Settlement Agreement 
(“MSA”).
38
  Big Tobacco agreed to make annual payments to the states for 
twenty-five years in exchange for the states abandoning their Medicaid 
reimbursement claims.
39
  Most importantly, the MSA prohibits the 




In 1996, the Department of Justice filed a civil suit under federal law
41
 
against eleven major tobacco companies for allegedly defrauding the public 
by producing harmful and addictive products and deliberately 
misrepresenting the risks of tobacco.
42
  The trial court found the defendants 
liable for fraud and deceit because they continued to market cigarettes 
toward young people, encouraged young people to smoke, and controlled 
nicotine levels in order to maintain addictions, all while keeping their 
research regarding nicotine confidential.
43
  Congress used the court’s 
factual findings as congressional findings when passing the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, which gave the 
36. Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 586–87 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972) (“Substantial evidence showed that the most persuasive advertising was being 
conducted on radio and television, and that these broadcasts were particularly effective in 
reaching a very large audience of young people . . . .  Thus, Congress had information quite 
sufficient to believe that a proscription covering only the electronic media would be an 
appropriate response to the problem of cigarette advertising.”).  
37. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 798.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MSA, supra note 21, § III; Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
Application, and Effect of Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) Between Tobacco Companies and 
Various States, and State Statues Implementing Agreement; Use and Distribution of MSA 
Proceeds, 25 A.L.R.6th 435 §§ 49-50 (2007). 
41. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
42. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 800; Miller, supra note 40, § 3.
43. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Miller,
supra note 40, § 3. 
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Plaintiff smokers have difficulty obtaining legal remedies for harms 
caused by cigarettes.  Most class action suits against Big Tobacco fail 
because courts are unwilling to certify the classes.  However, not all class 
actions are entirely unsuccessful.  In Castano v. American Tobacco Co., the 
Fifth Circuit refused to certify a nationwide class of addicted smokers.
45
  
The attorneys involved in Castano filed separate class actions in almost 
half the states.
46
  Though only one case—the class action filed in 
Louisiana—succeeded, cigarette manufacturers were ordered to pay $240 
million to fund smoking cessation services.
47
  In 2006, after a multi-phase 
class action trial, the Florida Supreme Court decertified a class of addicted 
Florida smokers and reversed the jury verdict of $175 billion in punitive 
damages.
48
  Despite this loss, the court allowed former class members to 
file individual suits based on the jury’s prior finding of defendants’ 
liability.
49
  As of 2013, these individual suits resulted in seventy-one 
plaintiff verdicts and thirty-four defense verdicts.
50
 
Few individual suits succeeded against tobacco companies because Big 
Tobacco tends to avoid liability by exhausting plaintiffs’ resources with a 
“refuse to settle” policy.
51
  The companies investigate and extensively 
interview the plaintiff as well as acquaintances in order to discover 
damaging information, and then exploit that information until the case is 
dismissed.
52
  The only way to deter this tactic is to punish Big Tobacco, but 
only four individuals in California have obtained favorable jury verdicts, 
and only about nine plaintiffs in other states.
53
  Although plaintiffs won 




44. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 800; 21 U.S.C. §§ 387, 387t (2012).
45. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); but see Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a trial court order denying class certification of nonsmoking 
flight attendants).  
46. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, app. 14.2 at 5.
47. Scott v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 36 So. 3d 1046 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
48. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
49. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, app. 14.2 at 4.
50. Id. at 5, tbl. 14.2.1.
51. Guardino & Daynard, supra note 14, at 36.
52. Id. at 36–37.
53. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, app. 14.3 at 4.
54. Id. at 5, tbl. 14.3.1.
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III. The MPAA and the Rating System
A. History of the MPAA
In the early 1920s, public outcry against offensive and indecent films
shown in public theaters led local and state governments to censor films.
55
  
In response, major film production studios and distributors organized and 
created the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), originally 
called Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America 
(“MPPDA”).
56
  In order to protect filmmakers from government 
censorship, the member studios essentially agreed to censor their own films 
via the Production Code—the first rating system.
57
  Nearly all filmmakers 
and film distributors released their films under the new voluntary rating 
system.  To do otherwise would have ensured economic failure because the 
film could have been subject to local censorship boards or boycotted by 
religious organizations.
58
  Thus, almost all filmmakers and distributors 
adhered to the MPAA’s voluntary process of film release, laying the 
groundwork for the modern system. 
Today, the MPAA sets out to advance the business and art of 
filmmaking, protect creative expression of filmmakers, and ensure the 
satisfaction of moviegoers.
59
  The MPAA’s current rating board—the 
Classification & Rating Administration (“CARA”)—consists of parents 
who assign ratings based on violence, sex, language, and drug use.
60
  The 
purpose of the ratings is to provide parents with information so they may 
decide which films are age-appropriate for their children.
61
 
B. Criticisms of the MPAA
The MPAA is often criticized for ineffective and inaccurate ratings.
This Film Is Not Yet Rated, a documentary that investigates the film rating 
system, notes that the ratings are much stricter on sexual content than 
violent content.
62
  According to another study conducted by Medscape, the 
55. Motion Picture Association of America, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/394174/Motion-Picture-Association-of-America-MPAA (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2016).  
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Jason K. Albosta, Dr. Strange-Rating Or: How I Learned That the Motion Picture
Association of America’s Film Rating System Constitutes False Advertising, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 115, 125–26 (2009). 
59. Our Story, MPAA, www.mpaa.org/our-story/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
60. Film Ratings, MPAA, www.mpaa.org/film-ratings/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
61. Id.
62. THIS FILM IS NOT YET RATED (BBC Films 2006).
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MPAA ratings do not adequately provide information for parents because 
movies with the same rating differ greatly with regard to their content.
63
 
Courts have also expressed criticism of the MPAA and its rating 
system.  In Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, for example, filmmakers 
challenged the MPAA’s “X” rating of their film.
64
  Although the court 
ultimately dismissed the filmmakers’ claims, the court “question[ed] the 
integrity of the present rating system.”
65
  Specifically, the court found the 
MPAA’s ratings were almost entirely subjective and did not adequately 
protect children because the rating board does not seek any professional 
guidance from child psychologists to assess any potential harm to 
children.
66
  The court emphasized that the MPAA explicitly neglects the 
wellbeing of children that the rating system should protect.
67
  The court 
also urged the MPAA to make changes to the rating system in light of these 
findings to avoid potential future liability.
68
 
More recently, the MPAA faced criticism for being unnecessary and 
powerless because it fails to address current issues in the industry.
69
  For 
example, in December 2014, when Sony Pictures Entertainment—a 
member studio—was the victim of Internet hackers, the MPAA did nothing 
in Sony’s defense.
70
  Furthermore, the MPAA has remained silent on the 
net neutrality debate, despite obvious member support, because one 
member, Comcast, does not support net neutrality.
71
  Although unrelated to 
the issues discussed in this note, these incidents and inconsistencies call 
into question the MPAA’s legitimacy.
72
  The current events involving the 
MPAA suggest that reform is necessary to preserve the organization’s 
integrity. 
63. Kimberly M. Thomas & Fumie Yokota, Violence, Sex, and Profanity in Films:
Correlation of Movie Ratings with Content, MEDSCAPE GEN. MED. 6(3) (July 12, 2004), 
http://www.kidsrisk.org/images/MGMmovies.pdf. 
64. 560 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
65. Id. at 733.
66. Id. at 734.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 736.
69. Alex Ben Block, So, Just How Impotent Is Today’s MPAA?, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb.
26, 2015), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/how-impotent-is-todays-mpaa-777284. 
70. Id.  In December 2014, internet hackers published confidential information of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, including emails surrounding the release of a controversial film.  Martin 
Fackler et al., Sony’s International Incident: Making Kim Jong-un’s Head Explode, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/world/sonys-international-incident-making 
-kims-head-explode.html.
71. Block, supra note 69.
72. Id.
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With respect to cigarettes, it was not until 2007 that the MPAA 
announced that it would include smoking as a factor for movie ratings.
73
  
Since then, only twelve percent of released films included “smoking” in the 
rating.
74
  This number may lead parents to believe that the rest of the 
released films do not depict cigarettes or smoking because they do not 
include “smoking” in the rating description.
75
  As a result, parents may 
inadvertently allow their children to watch films that expose them to 
smoking and cigarettes at a young age. 
There has been some speculation that the MPAA and member 
production companies are involved in illegal cigarette product placement 
agreements with Big Tobacco.  In the MSA, tobacco companies expressly 
agreed to end all product placement in films.
76
  By 2000, smoking in 
movies returned to the levels observed in 1950, when smoking was twice as 
prevalent.
77
  One explanation for this trend is that tobacco companies 
continue to engage in product placement deal in violation of the MSA.  
While there is no concrete evidence, the historical link between Hollywood 
and Big Tobacco, as well as the continued appearance of cigarettes in 
films, provides circumstantial evidence that cigarette product placement 
continues.
78
  This persistent relationship may also explain why the MPAA 
has failed to include smoking as part of its rating criteria, since  it may have 
a monetary incentive to refrain from doing so. 
IV. Analysis of Production Company Liability
The history of tobacco litigation suggests that smokers who have 
suffered health injuries have a low likelihood of successfully obtaining any 
legal remedies.  Federal law preempts certain claims against tobacco 
companies.
79
  The MSA also prevents various state law claims against the 
73. Jim Puzzanghera, Hollywood Set to Filter On-Screen Smoking, N.Y. TIMES (May 11,
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/11/business/fi-moviesmoking11. 
74. Sglantz, Fox Readies PG-Rated Film with Smoking, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO
CONTROL RES. & EDUC. (Nov. 21, 2013, 7:46 AM), https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/fox-readies-pg-
rated-film-smoking. 
75. Id.
76. MSA, supra note 21, § III(e)
77. Stanton A. Glantz et al., Back to the Future: Smoking in Movies in 2002 Compared with
1950 Levels, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 261, 261 (Feb. 2004), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC1448240/pdf/0940261.pdf. 
78. C. Mekemson & S. A. Glantz, How the Tobacco Company Built Its Relationship with
Hollywood, TOBACCO CONTROL (2002), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i81. 
full.pdf. 
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
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tobacco companies.
80
  This part considers whether movie production 
companies can be held liable for damages as a result of these injuries. 
A. Tort Liability of Production Companies
Courts have held that production companies are not liable for damages
associated with violence in movies because they owe no duty to 
consumers.
81
  In Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, Inc., family members 
of victims of the infamous Columbine High School shooting filed suit 
against video game companies and movie production companies under 
various negligence theories.
82
  The court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss these claims on the grounds that the companies owed no duty to the 
plaintiffs because they could not have foreseen the events that occurred at 
Columbine.
83
  Further, the court concluded that there was insufficient 




Similarly, in James v. Meow Media, Inc., parents of students who were 
killed by a classmate alleged that violent movies and video games produced 
by defendants caused the perpetrator’s actions.
85
  The Sixth Circuit held 
that the defendants could not have possibly foreseen the perpetrator’s 
violent criminal act.
86
  The court reasoned that the defendants owed no duty 
to the plaintiffs because they did not even know the student existed, and the 




Courts have made it clear that the plaintiffs in Sanders and Meow 
Media could not overcome the issues of duty and causation.  Although 
these legal barriers may arise, a similar claim against production companies 
for damages caused by cigarettes is distinguishable.  First, health damages 
caused by cigarettes are more foreseeable than a random violent act.  
Smoking is commonplace,
88
 whereas the incidents in the aforementioned 
80. MSA, supra note 21, § XII; Summary of the Master Settlement Agreement, TOBACCO 
FREE KIDS 4–5 (July 9, 2003), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0057.pdf; 
Miller, supra note 40, § 67. 
81. Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1273 (D. Colo. 2002).
82. Id. at 1268–70 (noting that plaintiffs sued video game companies and movie companies
under negligence and strict liability theories). 
83. Id. at 1273.
84. Id. at 1276.
85. 300 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2002).
86. Id. at 693.
87. Id. at 695.
88. In 2012, over twenty-seven percent of adults aged eighteen and older used a tobacco 
product, and 2.3 million people aged twelve and older first tried a tobacco product.  2014 
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 750. 
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cases involved random acts of violence.  Potential defendants are more 
likely to be aware of the negative health effects of smoking than random 
and unforeseeable violent acts.  Teens who see depictions of cigarettes in 
movies are three times more likely to begin smoking than those who do 
not.
89
  The evidence demonstrating depictions of smoking in movies as a 
main cause of adolescent smoking is clearly more than mere speculation. 
Thus, a court could find that the movie production companies owe a duty to 
consumers because it is foreseeable that the images portrayed in the media 
could easily influence young people. 
Second, the actions of third-party individuals proximately caused the 
harm in Sanders and Meow Media, not the actions of the defendants.  
Typically, a third-party criminal action will break the chain of causation.
90
  
A cause of action involving smoking is distinguishable because there is no 
third party to break the chain of causation—the cigarette causes the harm to 
the smoker.  Potential plaintiffs are the users of the product, and the 
defendants essentially “advertise” the product in films and thus become the 
“cause” of the harm.  However, potential plaintiffs must show that the 
depictions actually caused the initiation of smoking. 
Lastly, many social science scholars disagree about whether a 
correlation exists between violent media and violent actions.
91
  
Psychologist and Professor Christopher Ferguson criticizes studies that find 
such a correlation because the findings are insubstantial.
92
  Ferguson 
concludes that no evidence supports a finding that violent video games 
influence aggressive behavior, and cautions other researchers to be 
conservative with any opposing conclusion.
93
  Courts also reject findings 
that violent video games influence aggressive behavior and refuse to 
consider the studies as significant evidence.
94
  On the other hand, social 
scientists generally agree that cigarette depictions significantly influence 
youth smoking.  The 2012 Surgeon General Report concluded that 
adolescents who are exposed to depictions of smoking in movies are more 
likely to smoke.
95
  According to a study from New Zealand, nonsmoking 
teens who watched smoking in films “were nearly three times as likely to 
89. Rating Might Be Unlikely to Affect Teens Exposure to Smoking in Movies, PHYS.ORG
(Sept. 27, 2007), http://phys.org/news110117914.html#nRlv. 
90. Meow Media, 300 F.3d at 699.
91. Benedict Carey, Shooting in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/02/12/science/studying-the-effects-of-playing-violent-video-games.html. 
92. Christopher J. Ferguson, Video Games and Youth Violence: A Prospective Analysis in
Adolescents, 40 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 377, 378 (Dec. 14, 2010). 
93. Id. at 389–90.
94. Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (noting that “[t]hese 
[violent video game] studies have been rejected by every court to consider them . . .”). 
95. See 2012 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 564–98.
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be susceptible to begin smoking, even when the researchers controlled for 
age, gender, ethnicity, peer smoking, parental smoking, socioeconomic 
status, pocket money and household smoking rules.”
96
  Although some 
scholars are wary about the use of social science data as evidence,
97
 a court 
is likely to accept as evidence studies showing a relationship between 
smoking depictions in the media and youth smoking.
98
 
B. First Amendment Problems
Even if potential plaintiffs establish a prima facie case against movie
production companies, current First Amendment jurisprudence likely bars 
any claim against movie production companies.  The Sixth Circuit was 
reluctant to attach tort liability to the dissemination of ideas in order to 
avoid First Amendment problems.
99
  Courts are hesitant to impede this 
fundamental right by creating tort liability because movies are considered 
artistic speech and thus are fully protected.
100
  The courts in Meow Media 
and the court in Sanders both addressed potential First Amendment 
problems that would arise from holding defendants liable.  The plaintiffs in 
Meow Media first attempted to argue that violent movies and video games 
were obscene, and thus unprotected speech.
101
  The Sixth Circuit declined 
to consider violent material as obscene because obscenity typically only 
pertains to sexually explicit content.
102
  The court was unwilling to create 
another category of unprotected speech.
103
 
Plaintiffs then argued, in the alternative, that the video games incited 
violence, which caused consumers to commit violent acts.
104
  The court, 
applying the Brandenburg test
105
 for violent speech, rejected this 
argument.
106
  The court found that the defendants lacked the requisite intent 
to incite imminent violence, and the violence could not be considered 
96. Rating Might Be Unlikely to Affect Teens Exposure to Smoking in Movies, PHYS.ORG,
supra note 89. 
97. See Calvert, supra note 32, at 439.
98. See, e.g., Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972) (noting Congress showed sufficient evidence showing a relationship between 
smoking and broadcasting cigarette advertisements). 
99. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 695 (6th Cir. 2002).
100. Id. at 695–96.
101. Id. at 697.
102. Id. at 698.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court established a test to determine whether violent
speech is unprotected.  Speech that is directed to inciting imminent lawless action, and is likely to 
incite such action is considered unprotected. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
106. Meow Media, 300 F.3d at 698.
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imminent.
107
  After a thorough analysis of unprotected speech, the court 
declined to make any resolution of the constitutional issues, except to note 
that the constitutional concerns created a policy reason for refusing to 
attach tort liability.
108
  This case exemplifies potential smokers’ uphill 
battle in such claims against production companies for damages caused by 
smoking. 
The Meow Media plaintiffs went on to argue that some speech that is 
fully protected when directed at adults may be regulated when directed 
towards minors, and thus defendants should be liable for failing to prevent 
the inappropriate materials from reaching minors.
109
  The Sixth Circuit 
refused to impose tort liability for protected speech that was not sufficiently 
prevented from reaching minors.
110
  The court reasoned that limitations on 
speech directed at minors is an issue for legislative bodies and courts 
cannot adequately interpret speech limitations created in the course of a 
trial.
111
  As such, this case leaves open the question of whether a legislative 
body could limit speech of filmmakers—depictions of cigarettes in 
movies—to protect minors. 
V. Proposal
Government regulation has already successfully limited various other 
depictions of cigarettes.  The ban on cigarette advertising has been deemed 
constitutional, but, as previously mentioned, it does not extend to movies 
because the FCC does not govern movies.
112
  Currently, no regulations 
control cigarette depictions in Hollywood films, aside from the 
aforementioned (and arguably ineffective) addition of “smoking” to the 
MPAA rating criteria.  This part of the note proposes a policy that would 
prevent cigarette depictions in movies from reaching minors. 
Smokefree Movies, a research organization at University of California, 
San Francisco, advocates for any movie that depicts smoking or cigarettes 
to rated R in order to reduce youth exposure to cigarettes.
113
  This policy 
would discourage movie producers from placing cigarettes or smoking in 
movies because R-rated movies generally are not as economically 
107. Id.
108. Id. at 699.
109. Id. at 696; see also Sable Commc’ns v. Fed. Commc’n Comm., 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
110. Meow Media, 300 F.3d at 696–97
111. Id.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012); see generally Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), aff’d, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
113. Policy: R-Rate Films with Tobacco, SMOKEFREE MOVIES, http://smokefreemovies.
ucsf.edu/policy-solutions/r-rate-films-tobacco (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
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successful as movies with less strict ratings.
114
  There is sufficient evidence 
to support a causal relationship between adolescent smoking and cigarette 
depictions in movies.  A recent study found that PG-13- and R-rated 
movies affected smoking among youths equally.
115
  However, youth 
exposure to PG-13 movies is three times greater than that of R-rated 
movies.
116
  More adolescents watch PG-13-rated movies than R-rated 
movies, therefore eliminating smoking from PG-13 movies would reduce 
adolescent smoking by roughly eighteen percent.
117
  The study argues that 
giving those movies an R rating would significantly reduce youth smoking, 
but the MPAA is a private entity with no obligation to implement such a 
policy.  The next section contemplates ways to pressure the MPAA to 
implement a similar policy. 
A. MPAA Tort Liability
Legal action against the MPAA to seek damages for costs incurred and
injuries caused by cigarettes may pressure the MPAA to give movies with 
depictions of smoking an R rating.  Potential plaintiffs who bring a claim 
against the MPAA may not encounter the same duty and causation issues 
as in Sanders and Meow Media.  Unlike the defendant movie production 
companies, the MPAA may owe a duty to consumers.  When an entity on 
its own accord assumes the responsibility of advising consumers, the entity 
may assume a special duty to its consumers.
118
  The publicly stated mission 
of the MPAA and CARA is “to provide parents the tools they need to make 
informed decisions about what their children watch” and according to their 
website, ninety-three percent of parents find the ratings and descriptors 
useful while seventy-nine percent believe they are accurate.
119
  By 
voluntarily assuming the responsibility to provide information to parents 
and rate movies, the MPAA possibly owes a special duty to those parents. 
Other cases shed light on whether the MPAA owes a duty.  In Delgado 
v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., the California Court of Appeal rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument that the movie theater assumed a duty of care when
114. Id.
115. James D. Sargent et al., Influence on Motion Picture Rating on Adolescent Response to
Movie Smoking, 130 PEDIATRICS 228, 233 (Aug. 2012), http://pediatrics.aappublications. 
org/content/pediatrics/130/2/228.full.pdf. 
116. Id.
117. Id. at 228.
118. See Hanberry v. Hearst, 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that
Good Housekeeping owed a duty of care to consumers when it voluntarily entered the market and 
used its reputation to market other products). 
119. Film Ratings, MPAA, supra note 60; Joan Graves, Survey Shows 93% of Parents Find
Film Ratings Helpful in Making Movie Choices, MPAA (Nov. 30, 2015) http://www. 
mpaa.org/cara/#.VtVlMJMrKkY. 
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it adopted the rating system, and breached that duty by failing to prevent an 
unaccompanied minor from viewing an R-rated movie.
120
  The court 
reasoned that the rating system is meant to advise parents, and therefore 
any duty, if any, extends only to parents.
121
  Despite this conclusion, the 
court did not address the question of whether the MPAA owed any duty.  In 
Miramax Films, Corp. v. MPAA, the court strongly suggested the answer is 
yes.
122
  In dicta, the court stated, “[i]f the MPAA chooses to rate films for 
the benefit of children it is its duty to do so with standards that have a 
rational and professional basis . . . .”
123
  Although the court ultimately 
dismissed plaintiffs’ challenge to the rating system, the court warned that 




Even if a court finds the MPAA owes a duty, causation still remains a 
potential legal barrier.  Plaintiffs would have to show through social 
science evidence that they began smoking due to cigarette depictions in 
movies, and they watched those movies because the MPAA did not 
adequately rate them.  The chain of causation may be too attenuated to 
support a successful cause of action.  Nonetheless, a court may still find 
that the MPAA owes a special duty to potential plaintiffs and impose strict 
liability.  Arguably, the MPAA is misleading parents by failing to include 
“smoking” on all films that depict cigarettes. 
Social science data is persuasive evidence of causation, but alone it 
may be insufficient to hold the MPAA liable for damages.  Because social 
science data cannot prove anything absolutely true or absolutely false, 
Professor Calvert argues for a threshold for accumulation of consistent 
social science data.
125
  When this threshold is met, a causal relationship can 
be established in a legal context.
126
  According to various studies, 
depictions of cigarettes in movies have a stronger influence than traditional 
advertising.
127
  For example, a New Zealand study found that the more 
often adolescents watched R-rated films, the more likely they were to begin 
to smoke.
128
  Because the evidence suggests that there is a strong 
120. 72 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1406-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
121. Id.
122. See Miramax Films Corp. v. MPAA, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
123. Id. at 736.
124. Id.
125. Calvert, supra note 32, at 456.
126. Id.
127. About the Evidence, SMOKEFREE MOVIES, http://smokefreemovies.ucsf.edu/research/
about-evidence (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (estimating that exposure to on-screen smoking 
accounts for thirty-seven percent of U.S. smokers under the age of eighteen). 
128. Rating Might Be Unlikely to Affect Teens Exposure to Smoking in Movies, PHYS.ORG,
supra note 89. 
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correlation between smoking depictions in films and youth smoking, social 
science evidence should prove successful in court.  Accordingly, potential 
plaintiffs may be able to show causation. 
B. Consumer Protection Laws
Another theory of MPAA liability stems from state consumer
protection laws.  In California, consumers can file a claim under the 
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”),
129
 Unfair Competition Law 
(“UCL”),
130
 and False Advertising Law (“FAL”).
131
  Under a fraud 
theory,
132
 consumers must show that the MPAA materially misrepresented 
the goods or services, consumers actually relied on the misrepresentation, 
and the reliance caused the harm.
133
  For a statement to be a material 
misrepresentation, it must objectively be more than mere “puffery,” 




With respect to movie ratings, the ratings are undoubtedly “material” 
because, according to the MPAA’s own survey, eighty percent of parents 
use the rating system when choosing films.
135
  Given the formal rating 
process for every individual movie, the statements are more than 
generalizations and mere puffery.  Therefore, a reasonable person would 
perceive the rating as a material representation.  Proving the rating to be 
“false” may be more difficult because the ratings are essentially subjective.  
However, the widespread criticisms of the MPAA
136
 indicate a factual basis 
for the false ratings because the MPAA has no standard or structural 
system for the ratings.  Thus, the inconsistencies in the ratings render them 
false, or at a minimum, capable of being proven false. 
Actual reliance only requires consumers to indicate, with particularity, 
the statement relied upon, as long as the advertisement conveys the 
allegedly fraudulent statement.
137
  In the case of ratings, films are always 
129. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, 1770(a) (West 2014).
130. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2014).
131. Id. § 17500.
132. For claims based on fraud, the analysis is essentially the same under CLRA, UCL, and
FAL.  Rasmussen v. Apple, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1044–45 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Sateriale v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 793–94 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 
Cal.4th 298 (Cal. 2009). 
133. Rasmussen, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 1039; Sateriale, 697 F.3d at 794.
134. Rasmussen, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 1039; In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298.
135. Why: History of Ratings, CLASSIFICATION & RATING ADMIN., www.filmratings.
com/why.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
136. See supra Part II.b.
137. Rasmussen, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 1044.
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shown with the rating attached.  Consumers can easily indicate the specific 
rating relied upon and thus clearly satisfy this element. 
Lastly, under the CLRA, consumers must show that the 
misrepresentation was the immediate cause of the harm.
138
  This may be 
more difficult to prove, given the likelihood that the damages from 
smoking could take years to materialize.  However, if a lawsuit was 
brought as a class action, courts infer harm from the materiality of the 
statements.
139
  In other words, if the court finds the statements to be 
material misrepresentations that were made to every class member, 
causation is inferred.
140
  Here, since movie ratings are clearly “material,” a 
court could infer causation.  With regard to causation, the UCL and FAL 
only require a showing that members of the public are likely to be 
deceived, meaning that a significant portion of consumers can reasonably 
be misled.
141
  A large portion of the population is likely to be deceived 
because the MPAA’s self-reported high approval rating is sufficient to 
show that a majority of the population relies on the ratings.  Therefore, 
consumers may succeed under any of the three statutes. 
Even if potential plaintiffs are unsuccessful, legal action may put 
pressure on the MPAA to give greater weight to smoking in the rating 
criteria.  Given the criticism and perceived declining legitimacy of the 
MPAA, the organization may want to avoid the bad publicity that typically 
accompanies notable legal action. 
C. Government Regulation
Government regulation of the rating system is another possible
solution.  The government already regulates cigarettes in a variety of ways.  
Many local and state governments have banned the smoking of cigarettes in 
public places
142
 and have imposed a special tax on cigarettes.
143
  The 
federal government regulates cigarettes by way of the CLAA, which 
prohibits most cigarette advertising and requires tobacco companies to 
label all cigarette packages.
144
  The Tobacco Control Act furthers 
government control by giving the FDA authority to regulate cigarettes.
145
  
138. Sateriale, 697 F.3d at 793.
139. Allen v. Hyland’s, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 668 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 667.
142. E.g., CALABASAS, CAL., MUN. CODE § 8.12.040 (2006), https://www.municode.com/lib
rary/ca/city_of_calabasas/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT8HESA_CH8.12SENDSMCO. 
143. Cigarette & Tobacco Products Licensing, CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, 
http://www.boe.ca.gov/sptaxprog/cig_n_tob_prod_tax.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2016). 
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1335 (2012).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
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Though Congress and local governments have taken significant steps with 
regard to cigarette regulation, they must do so with the aim of preventing 
adolescent smoking. 
If the government can regulate cigarettes so strictly in other areas, it 
should be able to regulate their appearances in movies by imposing an R 
rating for any movie with depictions of smoking.  Any federal regulation of 
speech must still withstand a constitutional challenge.  A court would first 
determine whether the speech is commercial.  Courts have not clearly 
defined what constitutes “commercial speech,” but a court will usually 
consider whether it is a form of advertisement, whether it refers to a 
specific product, and whether the speaker has an economic motivation for 
the speech.
146
  Movie ratings may be considered a form of advertisement 
because consumers use ratings when deciding whether to view a specific 
product:  the film.  Although the ratings may not be directly economically 
related, it is related to an economic motive.  For example, informational 
pamphlets, alcohol content labels, and alcohol prices are all considered 
commercial speech.
147
  The MPAA’s stated mission is to promote the 
business of filmmaking,
148
 and thus likely falls under commercial speech. 
The MPAA would counter that the movies and ratings fall under 
artistic speech and are thus entitled to full protection under the First 
Amendment.
149
  Some circumstantial evidence indicates that tobacco 
companies still engage in product placement by illegally paying Hollywood 
producers to depict a specific brand of cigarettes in their films.
150
  If these 
allegations are proven to be true, there is no doubt that the ratings and the 
cigarette depictions in movies are commercial speech, and therefore are 
entitled to less protection.  Further, even if movies are artistic speech, the 
ratings themselves are unlikely to be artistic speech given their purely 
commercial purpose. 
In order to enforce a regulation requiring all movies with depictions of 
cigarettes to be rated R, Congress would have to show that the regulation 
directly advances a substantial government interest and materially 
alleviates the problems of youth smoking.
151
  However, speculation and 
conjecture are not enough to substantiate a government interest.
152
  Many 
146. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–68 (1983).
147. See generally id. at 68 (holding that informational pamphlets are commercial speech);
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (analyzing alcohol content labels under 
commercial speech standard); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) 
(analyzing alcohol prices as commercial speech). 
148. Our Story, MPAA, supra note 59.
149. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 682 (1968).
150. Mekemson & Glantz, supra note 78.
151. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
152. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 487.
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recent studies have concluded that movies significantly influence youth 
smoking and implementing this policy will decrease the problem by almost 
twenty percent.
153
  Though it should be noted that the varying degree of 
evidence from social science studies could create an obstacle because not 
all studies have come to the same conclusion.  The government also has a 
legitimate interest in reducing health care costs.  Smoking causes cancer, 
lung disease, and heart attacks,
154
 and many of these costs fall on local, 
state, and federal governments.  According to the 2014 Surgeon General 
Report, sixty percent of smoke-related health care expenditures, totaling 
$175.9 billion in 2013, were paid by public funds.
155
  In 2004, the health-
related cost of smoking totaled $9.6 billion in California.
156
  The MSA 
reimburses states for most of these costs, but some costs still may fall on 
federal and local governments.  Even if the monetary costs do not 
constitute a legitimate state interest, the government has a significant 
interest in protecting its citizens—namely young people—from the health 
harms caused by smoking. 
If the ratings were not deemed to be commercial speech, then the 
regulation would likely be considered a content-based restriction of artistic 
expression.  Content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid and 
subject to strict scrutiny, meaning the regulation must be narrowly tailored 
to the government’s objective, and there is no less restrictive alternative.
157
  
The proposed regulation is narrowly tailored as it only applies to movies 
shown to minors that depict cigarettes.  Production companies have a very 
broad right to creative expression, but regulations that limit speech in order 
to protect minors have been upheld, including profanity, incitements of 
violence, and obscenity.
158
  The legal issue here would be whether 
depictions of cigarettes fall under one of these categories.
159
  The proposed 
regulation, however, would not necessarily limit the speech of movie 
producers.  Rather, the MPAA would be required to give a certain rating to 
movies with smoking to protect minors from the content, which is not 
censorship at all. 
153. About the Evidence, SMOKEFREE MOVIES, supra note 127.
154. Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, supra note 1.
155. 2014 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 675 (“Annual smoking-attributable 
estimated health care expenditures are between $132.5 billion in 2009 to $175.9 billion in 
2013.”). 
156. HEALTH & ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & CAL.
TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAM (Mar. 2010), http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/tobacco/Docume 
nts/CTCPHealthEconCon_10.pdf. 
157. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)
158. Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968). 
159. This note will not explore this issue at length.
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In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Supreme Court 
struck down a California regulation that banned the sale of violent video 
games to minors and required their packaging to be labeled “18.”
160
  The 
Court rejected the state’s argument that violence falls into the unprotected 
speech category of obscenity, and therefore applied strict scrutiny.
161
  The 
Court reasoned that the self-regulating rating system was effective and 
filling the gap of concerned parents was not a compelling state interest 
since no significant link existed between violent video games and their 
influence on youth.
162
  The Court found that the regulation was 
overinclusive because it included children with parents who did not care if 
they purchased violent video games.
163
  The regulation was also 
underinclusive because it failed to include other violent media, such as 
violent books or cartoons.
164
 
At first glance, Brown seems to indicate that the proposed legislation 
would also fail to survive a constitutional challenge.  Courts and litigants 
should recognize, however, the significant differences between the 
California law and the proposed regulation.  In tobacco-related cases, 
ample studies support the conclusion that movies have a significant 
influence on youth smoking.
165
  This suggests that there are more concrete 
government interests with regard to adolescent smoking.  The government 
has a legitimate interest in preventing the youth population from the harms 
of cigarettes.  Smoking causes serious health problems,
166
 thus raising the 
cost of medical expenses that are eventually borne by the state.
167
  The 
proposed regulation is also narrowly tailored because it only pertains to 
depictions of cigarettes, as opposed to the blanket term of “violence.”  
Initially the regulation may appear underinclusive because it only applies to 
movies, rather than all media (such as television), but the government 
already regulates cigarettes through other mediums.  Since the government 
has the ability to regulate cigarettes under the CLAA and the Tobacco 
Control Act, arguably the proposed regulation on the movie rating system 
is another form of regulating cigarettes.  Nonetheless, a court may still find 
that the self-regulating MPAA rating system is effective, and therefore, 
160. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
161. Id. at 2738 (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it
is invalid unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is 
justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”). 
162. Id. at 2741.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2740.
165. 2012 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 564; Sargent et al., supra note 115,
at 229. 
166. See 2012 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 3.
167. Id. at 674.
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there is no need for government intervention.  Although the proposed 
legislation would be a successful solution to the problem of adolescent 
smoking, many organizations would likely express opposition.  
Nevertheless, the regulation may withstand a constitutional challenge 
despite the broad protection afforded to production companies. 
Lastly, one must consider whether the regulation would actually be 
effective.  A study in New Zealand found that ninety-four percent of 
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds in the sample watched R-rated movies, and 
thirty-eight percent watched them on a weekly basis.
168
  According to the 
study, the proposed regulation would be ineffective because minors still 
have access to R-rated movies.  The study did agree, however, that there is 
a strong correlation between adolescents who watch R-rated films and 
adolescents who smoke.
169
  Further, this single study is not enough to 
conclude that the regulation would not be effective because studies 
conducted in the United States almost unanimously agree that depictions of 
cigarettes in movies is a major cause of youth smoking.  As mentioned 
above, there is significant persuasive evidence supporting the conclusion 
that cigarettes in movies have a substantial influence on youth smoking. 
VI. Conclusion
Currently, courts hesitate to impose tort liability on production 
companies due to constitutional issues.  The companies may also claim that 
the First Amendment provides robust protection of creative expression in 
movies.  Courts and legislatures, however, should recognize a serious 
problem with the number of individuals who begin smoking at a young age.  
It is widely conceded that depictions of cigarettes in movies and other 
media have a substantial influence on youth smoking habits.  The best 
solution to this problem is to give an R rating to all movies that depict 
smoking.  As a result, movie producers would be inclined to remove 
smoking from films because R-rated films are generally less profitable.
170
 
The MPAA is a private organization, and therefore it is difficult to 
enforce any type of regulation with regard to movie ratings.  If the MPAA 
was held liable for damages caused by cigarettes due to inadequate ratings, 
the liability or threat of liability may pressure the organization to give 
stricter ratings to movies that depict smoking.  Plaintiffs must overcome the 
many legal hurdles, most importantly the First Amendment.  But holding 
the MPAA liable would not have any chilling effect on free speech because 
168. Rating Might Be Unlikely to Affect Teens Exposure to Smoking in Movies, PHYS.ORG,
supra note 89. 
169. Id.
170. Policy: R-Rate Films with Tobacco, SMOKEFREE MOVIES, supra note 113.
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the MPAA’s speech would not be impeded.  Rather, the MPAA could be 
held liable for failing to adequately provide film ratings to parents, which 
would not implicate any First Amendment issues. 
If that is unsuccessful, the threat of government implementation of the 
proposed regulation may pressure the MPAA to act.  Any legislation would 
be subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny, but there is a legitimate 
government interest in protecting youths from seeing that type of behavior.  
The government also has an interest in minimizing health care costs, which 
is negatively affected by smoke-related illnesses.  The regulation would 
further pressure movie production companies to decrease the amount of 
smoking pictured in movies in order to avoid an R rating. 
Regardless, any of these proposed solutions are a step in the right 
direction toward solving the problem of adolescent smoking.  The 
enormous health risks as well as health care costs outweigh any hesitation 
to act.  Fewer depictions of smoking in movies will lead to fewer 
individuals who will begin smoking at a young age. 
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* * *
